AuthInitWithoutChunks.seq - The CHUNKS parameter MAY be omitted in the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk if it is empty


  To verify that the CHUNKS parameter MAY be omitted in the INIT or 
  INIT-ACK chunk if it is empty. The SCTP endpoint will still has the
  capable to receive or send authenticated chunks.


  ./AuthInitWithoutChunks.seq [-tooloption ...] -pkt ./AuthInitWithoutChunks.def
    -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See Also: ../common/STD_PKT_COMMON.def


  Association is not established between endpoint A and B. Arrange
  data in endpoint A such that INIT chunk without CHUNKS parameter 
  but want to sent packet in authenticated way is sent to endpoint B.


  Endpoint A                             Endpoint B               ULP
  (CLOSED)                               (CLOSED)
    INIT          ------------------>
    (without CHUNKS parameter)
                  <------------------   INIT-ACK
                                        (with AUTH capable)
    COOKIE-ECHO   ------------------>
                  <------------------   COOKIE-ACK
    AUTH          ------------------>
    (with Unsupported HMAC Identifier)
                  <------------------  ERROR
                                       (Unsupported HMAC Identifier Error Cause)
  1. Attempt to make an association from endpoint A to B. Send INIT 
     message containing RANDOM Parameter and HMAC-ALGO Parameter, but
     without CHUNKS parameter.
  2. Check A: Association is established between endpoint A and B 
     with AUTH capable.
  3. Send AUTH chunk from endpoint A to B with Unsupported HMAC 
  4. Check B: ERROR should be received at endpoint A. And Error 
     cause in ERROR is set to "Unsupported HMAC Identifier".




  RFC 4895
  6.1.  Establishment of an Association Shared Key
    An SCTP endpoint willing to receive or send authenticated chunks MUST
    send one RANDOM parameter in its INIT or INIT-ACK chunk.  The RANDOM
    parameter MUST contain a 32-byte Random Number.  The Random Number
    should be generated in accordance with RFC 4086 [7].  If the Random
    Number is not 32 bytes, the association MUST be aborted.  The ABORT
    chunk SHOULD contain the error cause 'Protocol Violation'.  In case
    of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling of this Random
    Number follow the same pattern as those for the Verification Tag, as
    explained in Section 5.2.4 of RFC 2960 [5].  Therefore, each endpoint
    knows its own Random Number and the peer's Random Number after the
    association has been established.
    An SCTP endpoint has a list of chunks it only accepts if they are
    received in an authenticated way.  This list is included in the INIT
    and INIT-ACK, and MAY be omitted if it is empty.  Since this list
    does not change during the lifetime of the SCTP endpoint there is no
    problem in case of INIT collision.
    Each SCTP endpoint MUST include in the INIT and INIT-ACK a HMAC-ALGO
    parameter containing a list of HMAC Identifiers it requests the peer
    to use.  The receiver of an HMAC-ALGO parameter SHOULD use the first
    listed algorithm it supports.  The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST
    be supported and included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter.  An SCTP
    endpoint MUST NOT change the parameters listed in the HMAC-ALGO
    parameter during the lifetime of the endpoint.
    Both endpoints of an association MAY have endpoint pair shared keys
    that are byte vectors and pre-configured or established by another
    mechanism.  They are identified by the Shared Key Identifier.  For
    each endpoint pair shared key, an association shared key is computed.
    If there is no endpoint pair shared key, only one association shared
    key is computed by using an empty byte vector as the endpoint pair
    shared key.
    The RANDOM parameter, the CHUNKS parameter, and the HMAC-ALGO
    parameter sent by each endpoint are concatenated as byte vectors.
    These parameters include the parameter type, parameter length, and
    the parameter value, but padding is omitted; all padding MUST be
    removed from this concatenation before proceeding with further
    computation of keys.  Parameters that were not sent are simply
    omitted from the concatenation process.  The resulting two vectors
    are called the two key vectors.
    From the endpoint pair shared keys and the key vectors, the
    association shared keys are computed.  This is performed by selecting
    the numerically smaller key vector and concatenating it to the
    endpoint pair shared key, and then concatenating the numerically
    larger key vector to that.  If the key vectors are equal as numbers
    but differ in length, then the concatenation order is the endpoint
    shared key, followed by the shorter key vector, followed by the
    longer key vector.  Otherwise, the key vectors are identical, and may
    be concatenated to the endpoint pair key in any order.  The
    concatenation is performed on byte vectors, and all numerical
    comparisons use network byte order to convert the key vectors to a
    number.  The result of the concatenation is the association shared