#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# SCTP Conformance Test Suite Implementation
# (C) Copyright Fujitsu Ltd. 2008, 2009
#
# This file is part of the SCTP Conformance Test Suite implementation.
#
# The SCTP Conformance Test Suite implementation is free software;
# you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
# the GNU General Public License version 2 as published by
# the Free Software Foundation.
#
# The SCTP Conformance Test Suite implementation is distributed in the
# hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even
# the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
# PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to
# the Free Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place - Suite 330,
# Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
#
# Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
# email address(es):
#    networktest sctp <networktest-sctp@lists.sourceforge.net>
#
# Or submit a bug report through the following website:
#    http://networktest.sourceforge.net/
#
# Written or modified by:
#    Hiroaki Kago <linuxsctp-kg@ml.css.fujitsu.com>
#    Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
#
# Any bugs reported given to us we will try to fix... any fixes shared will
# be incorporated into the next SCTP release.
#
##############################################################################
BEGIN {	$V6evalTool::TestVersion = '$Name: REL_1_0_0 $'; }

use lib "../common";
use V6evalTool;
use SCTP;

%pktdesc = (
	sctp_chunk_auth_bad_hmac_len	=> "Send SCTP CHUNK_AUTH (HMAC length not match HMAC Algorithm)",
	sctp_chunk_abort		=> "Recv SCTP CHUNK_ABORT (Protocol Violation)",
);

$IF0 = Link0;

vCapture($IF0);

sctpCheckEnv($IF0);

sctpStartServer($IF0);

vConnectAuth($IF0);

vLogHTML('<B>================ Main Test =================</B>');

vSend($IF0, sctp_chunk_auth_bad_hmac_len);

%ret = vWarpRecv($IF0, 10, 0, 0, sctp_chunk_abort);
if ($ret{status} != 0 || $ret{recvFrame} ne 'sctp_chunk_abort') {
	vLogHTML('Cannot receive SCTP CHUNK_ABORT');
	vLogHTML('<FONT COLOR="#00FF00">NG</FONT>');
	exit $V6evalTool::exitFail;
}

vLogHTML(OK);
exit $V6evalTool::exitPass;

######################################################################
__END__

=head1 NAME

  AuthWithBadHmacLength.seq - Authentication Chunk is received with HMAC length not match HMAC Algorithm

=head1 PURPOSE

  To verify that if the AUTH chunk is received with HMAC length not
  match HMAC Algorithm, the ABORT chunk SHOULD be sent with the error
  cause 'Protocol Violation'.

=head1 SYNOPSIS

=begin html
<PRE>
  <A HREF="./AuthWithBadHmacLength.seq">./AuthWithBadHmacLength.seq</A> [-tooloption ...] -pkt <A HREF="./AuthWithBadHmacLength.def">./AuthWithBadHmacLength.def</A>
    -tooloption : v6eval tool option
  See Also: <A HREF="../common/STD_PKT_COMMON.def">../common/STD_PKT_COMMON.def</A>
            <A HREF="../common/SCTP_COMMON.def">../common/SCTP_COMMON.def</A>
</PRE>

=end html

=head1 PRE-TEST CONDITION

  Association is established between endpoint A and B. Arrange data 
  in endpoint A such that AUTH chunk with HMAC length not match HMAC
  Algorithm is sent to endpoint B.

=head1 TEST PROCEDURE

  Endpoint A                             Endpoint B               ULP
  (ESTABLISHED)                          (ESTABLISHED)

    AUTH          ------------------>
    (with HMAC length not match HMAC Algorithm)
                  <------------------  ABORT
                                       (Protocol Violation)

  TEST DESCRIPTION:

  1. Send AUTH chunk from endpoint A to B with HMAC length not 
     match HMAC Algorithm.
  2. Check A: ABORT should be received at endpoint A. And Error 
     cause in ERROR is set to "Protocol Violation".

=head1 NOTE

  None

=head1 REFERENCE

  RFC 4895

  5.1.  Authentication Chunk (AUTH)

    This chunk is used to hold the result of the HMAC calculation.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Type = 0x0F   |   Flags=0     |             Length            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    Shared Key Identifier      |        HMAC Identifier        |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    \                             HMAC                              /
    /                                                               \
    /                               +-------------------------------\
    |                               |           Padding             |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                  Figure 5

    Type: 1 byte (unsigned integer)
      This value MUST be set to 0x0F for all AUTH-chunks.

    Flags: 1 byte (unsigned integer)
      SHOULD be set to zero on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.

    Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
      This value holds the length of the HMAC in bytes plus 8.

    Shared Key Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
      This value describes which endpoint pair shared key is used.

    HMAC Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
      This value describes which message digest is being used.  Table 2
      shows the currently defined values.

=begin html
<PRE>
    <B>HMAC: n bytes (unsigned integer)
      This holds the result of the HMAC calculation.</B>
</PRE>

=end html

    Padding: 0, 1, 2, or 3 bytes (unsigned integer)
      If the length of the HMAC is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender
      MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes to make the chunk 32-bit
      aligned.  The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 3 bytes and it MUST
      be ignored by the receiver.

    The control chunk AUTH MUST NOT appear more than once in an SCTP
    packet.  All control and data chunks that are placed after the AUTH
    chunk in the packet are sent in an authenticated way.  Those chunks
    placed in a packet before the AUTH chunk are not authenticated.
    Please note that DATA chunks can not appear before control chunks in
    an SCTP packet.